



Volume 2	Issue 1	July (2022)	DOI: 10.47540/ijqr.v2i1.594	Page: 54 – 60
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Objective-Subjective in Political Economy Communication Conflict within Legislature and Aceh Government

Zulham¹, Khairina AR.², Jummaini², Ristati²

¹Faculty of Social Science and Political Science, Malikussaleh University, Indonesia

²Faculty of Economics, Malikussaleh University, Indonesia

Corresponding Author: Zulham; Email: zulham@unimal.ac.id

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords: Communication Conflicts, Objective-Subjective Barriers, Political Economy.

Received : 29 June 2022

Revised : 20 July 2022

Accepted : 23 July 2022

ABSTRACT

Interest will make someone selective in responding to or living a message. People will only pay attention to stimuli that have to do with their interests. The executive and legislative interests are power. The problem raised is that the achievement of power can be achieved by establishing effective communication. Collapsed communication between the executive and the legislature tends to lead to conflicts in the economy and politics. Based on this phenomenon, the author raises the issue of the occurrence of political economy communication conflicts between the two regional institutions. This research was conducted in Aceh, the approach used was qualitative using objective-subjective barrier theory, conflict theory, communication, communication conflict, and political economy. This study aims to determine the problems that arise in the political economy conflict. This research was conducted using observation and interview techniques. Furthermore, the data were analyzed descriptively. The results of this study are: prejudice is a factor in communication conflict. The lack of transparency and the governor's reluctance to sit down with members of the Aceh legislature to discuss regional and financial policies are considered by the council as a strategy by the governor to take advantage of the unilateral use of the budget.

INTRODUCTION

The contradiction of political interests greatly hinders political communication between the two institutions. Political interest is a goal to be achieved by the government and the legislature. Differences in interests in the country are not something taboo. Normally a government wheel must be built with many interests. These interests are then translated into regional development. Problems arise when the interests of one another conflict with each other. The interests of the Aceh Governor and DPR are marked by many interests that are not accommodated through communication. In general, if you look at the interests of the two institutions, they both want to carry out development in Aceh. Development is closely related to budget support. If the budget communication is not opened, the friction will not be resolved.

Executive-legislative power is very clear according to existing rules. There are indications that the governor uses his power in Aceh only as an independent body without the need for other institutions that have powers as well. The governor even thought that he was more powerful than the legislature. If viewed more wisely, the Aceh DPR has the power of the people who represent the interests of the people in the form of representatives, namely the DPR. Members of parliament always directly reap many questions and requests for development in various sectors by citizens. Meanwhile, the governor did not experience the same thing as what the members of the council felt when they met their respective constituents. In regional development, people often ask the legislature rather than the executive (Zantsi, 2020).

The above understanding can be understood that the Aceh legislative body must clarify to the

governor to answer all questions raised by the people to the legislature. Consequently council members, when they win, must first fight for the interests of the people from which they were elected. In addition, the governor did not win in all areas of Aceh, so to maintain this balance the eighty-one people in the Aceh DPR could annul it. Because they can reach out not only to areas where the governor has majority support but also to those who do not support the governor. Simultaneously, the two executive-legislative institutions have made promises to the people, but these promises cannot be implemented when the governor does not open communication.

Legislative members are very consistent with their efforts to communicate with the Governor. Communication will be established if there is a mutual understanding (Zulham, et al, 2019). The executive understands the interests of the legislature, the legislature recognizes the interests of the executive. More importantly, if the two interests are jointly combined and then from these interests it is prioritized which one is more beneficial to the interests of the people than the interests of the institution. Sectoral egos tend to appear on the public surface when each institution emphasizes the interests of the institution. Therefore, the need for a relentless attitude (to give in) can restrain the sectoral ego that occurs. Unlike the case with the governor, the governor must quickly and always be one-sided in making decisions without making adjustments to the parties in the legislature. In contrast to the members of the legislature, wherein number there are many members, but in terms of interests, they can unite. The governor acts on behalf of the individual and cannot adjust to the legislature.

In other words, the attitude of the executive who is not open to discussing regional funds collectively between the two institutions, the occurrence of prejudice bias from the community, not only that, the suspicion of members of the legislature towards the absence of budget transparency that is regulated and managed by the executive makes them emotional and opposes all policies that are implemented (Santiso, 2011; Harrison & Sayogo, 2014). Programmed by the Aceh government. Sometimes the people do not have a platform to communicate with the executive in obtaining budget information for Aceh's

development. The Aceh parliament itself does not have valid data on what budget will be distributed to the community. So that this information uncertainty increases the volume of political communication conflicts between these two local government institutions.

METHODS

This research was conducted in Banda Aceh. Based on research in the field, where researchers have conducted observations, literature studies, and in-depth interviews using question forms and voice records as research instruments. Furthermore, the data were analyzed descriptively. The approach used in this study is qualitative. This research is qualitative, therefore the purpose of this research is to make a systematic, factual, and accurate description, picture, or painting of the facts, characteristics, and relationships between the phenomena being investigated (Ningi, 2022). In this context, the author emphasizes research based on existing facts or phenomena related to conflict, communication, and political economy, so that what is produced or recorded is in the form of exposure as it is. The approach used is also a little historiographical study, which is a way of writing, presenting, or reporting the results of historical research that has been carried out (Pleshkevich, 2019; Xianming, 2020). However, researchers are more dominant in using the conflict resolution approach, and political economy communication. The theories it produces are usually referred to as conflict and communication theories (Craig, 2014; Ellis, 2019). Meanwhile, humanistic approaches are also widely applied in research on conflict issues, group communication, organizational communication, mass communication, and others (Folger, et al, 2021).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Based on the illustration above, it can be explained that (1) conflict is a latent (potential) condition due to different individual, organizational and environmental factors, causing many differences. On that basis (2) individuals or groups know that conflict in the organization can be felt. They reflect through (3) differences in perception and value goals and take oppositional actions. (4) the conflict moves and is gradually manifested, if it continues it is manifested in the form of open

aggression between the conflicting parties. (5) In principle, conflicts must be resolved by taking into account the various sources of causes through conflict management. Causes of Conflict There are several major theories about the causes of conflict.

The things that trigger various conflicts can include: (a) prejudice, (b) misunderstanding, (c) stubbornness or selfishness, (d) sensitivity and irritability, (e) differences in interpretation, (f) dependence in carrying out work, (g) differences in methods and methods, (h) differences in interests and needs, (i) differences in cultural value backgrounds, (j) differences in goals, (k) competition for status or promotion, (l) reduced certain sources, influence, money, time, space, popularity, and position (De Dreu, 2014;). As for political communication is the delivery of politically characterized messages by political actors to other parties (Davis, 2010; Omonov, 2021). This activity is empirical. because it is done in real life in social life. Meanwhile, as a scientific activity, political communication is one of the political activities in the political system. Political communication is communication that is directed at achieving an influence in such a way, so that the problems discussed by this type of communication activity can bind all its citizens through a jointly determined sanction.

Furthermore, communication barriers generally have two characteristics: objective and subjective. Objective obstacles are disturbances and obstacles to the flow of communication, which are not intentionally made by the other party but may be caused by unfavorable circumstances. Weather disturbances to the course of radio speeches; Traffic disruption to lectures at a roadside venue, is an objective obstacles. Obstacles or obstacles that are objective may also be caused by a lack of communication skills, for example, "field of experience", which is not "in tune" between the communicator and the communicant, poor presentation approach, inappropriate timing, wrong use of media, etc.

Subjective obstacles are those that are intentionally created by other people so that they are distractions and opposition to a communication effort. The basis of this disturbance and opposition is usually due to conflicts of interest, prejudice, greed, envy, apathy, and so on. Factors of interest and prejudice are the most severe factors because

the most difficult effort for a communicator is to communicate with people who do not like the communicator or present a communication message that contradicts the facts or issues that interfere with an interest. If a person is confronted with a form of communication that he does not like because it interferes with his educational status or interests, then the person usually mocks the communication or may also evade and nonchalantly discredit the communication message as difficult to understand. Symptoms of ridiculing and circumventing a communication to then discredit or mislead the communication message, are called evasion of communication (Mikkelsen, 2017).

Furthermore, political economy is part of social science based on two sub-disciplines, namely politics and economics. Political economy is indeed an interdisciplinary science learning where it is divided into two disciplines and is used to analyze other social sciences with issues relevant to political economy issues (Gailmard, 2021). This science examines two types of science, namely political science and economics, which are combined into one study of political economy. The focus of this study of political economy is economic phenomena that in general continue to roll and then be reviewed so that they can be more specific. But because along with the development of this term it always refers to the interaction of the two aspects, both economic and political. To the writer's synthesis, political economy relations cannot be separated from the activities of national, provincial, and local governments. Regional political economy actors are the executive and legislative at the regional level, namely representatives of the central government as a bridge for resolving community conflicts in the regions, such as poverty alleviation and market supervision, and so on.

There is a prejudice that states that the budget that is discussed unilaterally by the governor, indicates a hidden agenda that is being carried out by the executive for the personal needs of the provincial leadership. The governor was adamant that he did not open dialogue to accommodate the interests of not only the needs of the council's household budget but even the budget that should be known to the people as well. According to the author's observations, the reaction to public prejudice was that there were rampant public demonstrations in Aceh asking and criticizing the

governor's transparency on regional budgets, which were discussed unilaterally. The Aceh government law provides an opening for the two institutions to compromise on a joint budget review.

This gap provides for the opening of space so that there is no prejudice from both parties. Communication conflicts can of course be minimized and even eliminated if political communication is built both in the discussion of other regional policies added to the budget. However, the governor ignored the guarantees of the Aceh Government's law. Where political communication is not accommodated by him. Confusion is increasing among the people, suspicions are becoming evident that the governor is not taking sides with the Acehnese in a time of lack of budget transparency. All elements in Aceh are worried about what will happen to the governor considering he is so diligent that he does not respond to all public questions regarding budget transparency and the involvement of the people in hearing public opinions and testing the public's due diligence on Aceh government policies. So it can be confirmed that it is clear that this prejudice makes communication conflicts worse. Then the level of compliance with regulations or procedures and provisions, members of the Aceh DPR tend to be process goals, they don't care that the most important thing is that the goals they are interested in are achieved, this is understandable because the councils, in general, have no academic background, not academics, not bureaucracy, and not people who understand the rules comprehensively. Meanwhile, the executive adheres to the regulations very strictly, and adheres to the rules very strictly, especially as a bureaucrat he is more likely to follow administrative rules and habits.

Many communication conflicts are disrupted when requests from the legislature are not by existing regulatory provisions, for example, the aspiration fund or now it's called Pokir (main idea), so the DPRA has the desire that their thoughts or aspirations be accommodated even though they are not by the provisions or procedures. , in contrast to the executive who does not want, for example, there is a provision that the Aceh government's authority can spend funds for activities that are within the authority of the Aceh government, but outside the authority, it cannot be accommodated. For example, building a village road is the district's authority, the

executive may not interfere with the district's authority. Another example is the construction of irrigation, each of which has its provisions, how much the provincial government can build and how much the district government can build, while the DPRA doesn't care about that interest, important council members in the village from which their constituents come from must get projects and this causes a difference in perception in a matter, the substance in terms of procedures all proposed activities must be discussed in the *Musrembang*. As the author described earlier.

The governor thought that legislators from the Aceh party and the Aceh party (PA) were very protective of the exclusivity of their party. Indeed, the formation of the Aceh Party was part of the idea and struggle for the demand that local parties in Aceh be allowed and conveyed in the Helsinki negotiations. In its development, the formation of parties by GAM is exclusive but does not openly accommodate elements other than cadres who have been involved in GAM. Although ideologically, the Aceh Party is referred to as an open party, in practice this is not the case. GAM's exclusivity as a group is caused by several things.

First, on the other hand, they still "do not believe" in the commitments of other groups because they are considered to cause their political goals and targets to not be achieved. In addition, the Aceh Party, which is supported by former GAM organizations such as KPA and the GAM Assembly which was formed after the Helsinki MoU, illustrates that former GAM strongly believes that their political power cannot be dammed by other groups. This existence is important, related to changes in the political situation in the 2009 and post-2009 elections as well as for the future of Aceh and the escort of the Helsinki MoU, namely when they already controlled the parliament in Aceh, won the governorship, and many regents and mayoral positions in the Aceh region.

Communication conflicts between the executive and the legislature and if there are other Aceh internal problems, if they are equally wise, they can be resolved by fellow Acehnese officials. The practice of the executive-legislative institutions when there is chaos in Aceh is very intense to involve the central government. The mediation process was carried out while in Jakarta, but the settlement process did not last long, meaning it

could be said that it was not finished either. The conflicts that often occur in the Aceh government are considered by the central government to be part of the local government's inability to be independent in their household affairs and unable to be independent. Even more tragically, the central government considers the Aceh government stupid. Jakarta has given great privileges to the province so that Aceh can progress, both in the form of special autonomy funds,

These aids seem to have plunged the Acehnese government into motives of mutual revenge, interests, prejudice, and power struggles to gain momentary gains. This is a form of decline in the Aceh government apparatus. The governor and legislators were part of the responsibility for Aceh's decline. The inability to resolve internal conflicts by putting aside the shared ego a little, then there will be no prosperity for the people of Aceh. With the governor's regulation (Pergub), members of the legislature think that they can't do anything anymore, this is an open secret if for example at what level of council members they will get. Different levels of office, different income receipts. From the chairman of the council, the head of the faction, the vice chairman can manage 10 billion. So how do they play it and they can leave it in the offices, claiming that it belongs to them, then another method that is carried out in the field by members of the council is by sending contractor workers to the office and governor's office. This pattern is often the case.

The funds are large but the implementation of the construction is very small. Large funds can be channeled to the implementation of large infrastructure as well. Construction of roads, irrigation, and other places needed by the community as a means of transportation. The division of rations is often heard in projects undertaken by members of the legislature. Each member of the legislature has a relationship that will build a project that has been agreed upon by them with the contractor. Depending on how much approval the contractor can contribute funds from the project to the member of the legislature concerned. These project funds are often used by the legislature to strengthen its constituents. Election promises that used to be used as political investments into the future. Because all political activities carry expensive political costs.

From a legal perspective, it must be very firm, because now there are rules for planning and work programs, the goal is to balance the existence of existing social strata, from technocrats, politicians, state civil servants, and others. Likewise, the executive seeks to balance its position with the legislature. The executive puts forward the principle of flexibility, not being too hasty in limiting the bureaucratic process so that it is too fast to decide without any administrative compromise solution. In another sense, the executive is very instant in telling the legislature the answer no. The impact of this rigidity closes all activities with the legislature to prepare their budgets as part of the work program. The policy is understood not only in terms of conformity with regulations, it is wiser to understand it in a political context. The powers of legislators consist of oversight, budgeting, and making regulations (legislation). All functions of board members are very clearly enshrined in the law. For example, the budget function has been stated in the existing government regulation (Permen), which is a solution if there is a meeting point between the two institutions.

The frequent delays of board members in submitting programs that have accumulated in the main idea program (Pokir) to the executive are considered by the executive as an obstacle to the executive work program. Usually, in May all government public service sectors are final for submission of their respective work programs. The delay often triggers executive-legislative conflict. The slow submission of work programs by members of the council is due to the dependence of the legislative members' work programs on the constituents, so this is the reason that slows down the program input process. All activities that have been proposed by the legislature are included in the Aceh Revenue and Expenditure Budget Plan (APBA). In addition, the concerns of legislators about the loss of the work program they have submitted to the executive are also very high. The concern about the elimination of the basic thought budget (Pokir) is unfounded. Local governments are already supported by all-digital technology.

All inputted budgets have been supported by e-planning and e-budgeting programs. The system is less likely to be lost or deleted programs that already exist in the electronics. To support the process of inputting the program properly, it is

necessary to comply with the legislature, problems occur more often when members of the council do not submit electronically and submit submissions late. The system is less likely to be lost or deleted programs that already exist in the electronics. To support the process of inputting the program properly, it is necessary to comply with the legislature, problems occur more often when the legislature does not submit an electrical submission and the submission is late. The system is less likely to be lost or deleted programs that already exist in the electronics. To support the process of inputting the program properly, it is necessary to comply with the legislature, problems occur more often when the legislature does not submit an electrical submission and the submission is late.

The specificity of the Aceh region as the "Special Region of Aceh" is supported by a large amount of budget from the central government. Regional autonomy funds, special autonomy funds, and other additional funds in the APBD. The existing sources of funds are prioritized for all Aceh interests, from the infrastructure to the superstructure. If there are funds that are less than the program proposed by the legislature, the executive usually allocates from the special autonomy fund as funding support for the work program of legislative members. Therefore, the concerns of members of the legislature cannot be used as an excuse for an obstacle to political communication between the two institutions. Because the funds are very adequate at the provincial level. The delay in submitting program funds by the legislature can be understood as the reason why the executive is frustrated every year. The distribution of development funds from the special autonomy (Otsus) budget is determined by a separate ratio and there is a procedure for its allocation. The distribution allocation is sixty percent (60%) for the province of Aceh and forty percent (40%) for districts/cities.

The governor has not been able to show the public his ability to build political communication. The creation of constructive political communication can facilitate all executive policies and prevent deadlocks between the two executive-legislative. The birth of a governor in the government is the result of the people's political choices, of course, the governor has a responsibility to the community. In this context, the governor has

a moral responsibility and burden on the Acehnese people. The people have brought the governor to the seat of power. Similar to the Aceh DPR, members of the legislature are also born from the public and share a moral burden on the people.

CONCLUSION

The factor of interest cannot be avoided from the obstacle to communication conflicts between the Governor and the Aceh Political Economy. The governor wants to enforce regulations and procedures according to existing laws. Such as non-compliance actions for members of the council who do not submit their respective budgets during the *Musrembang* and are not to be tolerated by the executive. Because if this is accommodated, they will be trapped in deals that violate the rules. However, members of the legislature view this attitude as an attempt by the Governor to slow down the function and role of the legislature. Another barrier to communication is prejudice. The lack of transparency and the Governor's reluctance to sit down with members of the Aceh legislature to discuss regional and financial policies are considered by the council as a strategy by the Governor to take advantage of the unilateral use of the budget. There are suspicions about where the budgets will be taken, the suspicion could be for political interests. The governor mumbled that the members of the council only thought of their political cost interests, with an effort to profit from small projects instead of doing big projects to build roads such as roads in their constituency. So that the obstacles above can be referred to as objective and subjective political economy.

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